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Comments and Casenotes
Constructive Adverse Possession vs. Constructive
Possession Under Paper Title
Goen v. Sansbury'
In a proceeding by landowners (appellants) against
an adjoining owner (appellee) to remove a cloud on
the title to a tract of land claimed by both parties,
the appellants showed a clear chain of record title from
1844 to the present, dating back to a common owner,
whereas the tract of land owned by the appellee first ap-
peared of record in her chain of title in 1867. In 1924 the
appellee recorded a subdivision plat covering part of her
land including the area in dispute. In 1938 the appellants
sub-divided their land in order to sell lots, at which time
their surveyor discovered an overlap in the lines of the
two subdivisions which indicated a triangular encroach-
ment into the appellants' property covering some 5 acres.
The evidence showed that in 1925 the appellee had made
and recorded a plat including the area in dispute, had
staked off lots, extensively advertised, and had held an
auction sale of lots which apparently covered the area in
dispute. The auction, however, was called off because
of the low bids. There was no evidence of any acts or con-
duct in relation to the disputed area from 1925 until 1938,
other than the payment of taxes by both parties on the
triangle in controversy.2 Neither the appellants nor the
appellee actually occupied the area in controversy nor sold
lots out of it, although both were in actual possession of
other parts of the adjoining tracts. In 1938 there was some
discussion between the appellants and appellee concern-
ing the land boundaries, and the appellants recorded a plat
covering their land. The appellants began the instant suit
within 20 years of 1938, but the lower court held that
appellee had acquired title by adverse possession as a re-
sult of opening up the property in 1925, the appellants not
having met the burden of proving their continuing title
to date of suit.
1219 Md. 289, 149 A. 2d 17 (1959).
2There was some evidence that appellee had maintained a stable on the
disputed triangle but the Court found such evidence Insufficient.
GOEN v. SANSBURY
In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that although
appellants, as plaintiffs, had the burden of proof, once they
had established their title of record, and possession of part
of their land, and encroachment thereon by appellee, the
burden of proving title by adverse possession was shifted
to the appellee and had not been met. Appellee needed
to show open, continuing, and adverse occupancy. Stated
otherwise, the Court's decision was that the appellants,
having a valid record title to the whole land and being in
actual possession of part of it, had constructive possession
of the disputed area which was superior to the appellee's
claim under color of title, where neither actually occupied
the area in dispute.
Generally, actual possession of part under color of title
creates constructive adverse possession of all unoccupied
land within the boundaries laid down in the instrument
giving color of title.8 However, in the case of an overlap
of boundaries, the holder of the junior and inferior title,
if he is to acquire good title by adverse possession, must
enter and actually hold the disputed area adversely and
continuously for the requisite period of time; and it is not
enough that he enters into possession of the part of the
land within his paper color of title which is outside the
lines of the land in dispute.4 This exception to the rule of
constructive adverse possession means that the actual pos-
session by the rightful owner of part of the land embraced
in his deed overcomes the constructive adverse possession
to that land actually occupied.5
This exception to the rule of constructive adverse pos-
session under color of title seems to be well established
in Maryland. In the case of Hines v. Symington," a railroad
set up the defense of constructive adverse possession under
color of title, and although the case turned on the finding
that there had been no instrument giving color of title,
the court stated: ". . . possession of part of a tract of land
by the rightful owner is constructive possession of the
whole as against one in possession, of a part and claiming
the whole under color of title, except as to the part actually
8 Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295 (1926).
'Parrish v. Foreman-Blades Lumber Co., 217 F. 335, 338 (4th Cir. 1914).
SHunnicut v. Peyton, 102 U.S. 333 (1880); Elliott v. Hensley, 184 Ky.
144, 222 S.W. 507 (1920) ; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 228, 50 S.W. 824 (1899) ;
Schmitt v. Traphagen. et al., 73 N.J. Eq. 399, 69 A. 189 (1908) ; Patrick v.
Goolsby, 158 Tenn. 162, 11 S.W. 2d 677 (1928); Claiborne v. Elkins, et al.,
79 Tex. 380, 15 S.W. 395 (1891) ; Stull v. Rich Patch Iron Co., 92 Va.
253, 23 S.E. 293 (1895).
'137 Md. 441, 112 A. 814 (1921).
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occupied by the claimant."7 This rule was based on the
decision in Schlossnagle v. Kolb," where the court held that
where the defendant was in constructive adverse possession
under color of title of a tract of land owned by plaintiff's
predecessor, who had leased part of the tract to others,
the leasing stopped the running of the statute as to all of
the land not actually possessed by the defendant, so that
the sale 12 years later to the plaintiff entitled the plaintiff
to maintain an action of trespass q.c.f.9
In the instant case, since appellants were in actual pos-
session of part of the tract embraced in, their deed, the
only way appellee could acquire title to the disputed area
would be by actual adverse possession. To establish ad-
verse possession, a claimant must show that the possession
was actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous or
uninterrupted for the statutory period of twenty years.0
What acts are sufficient to constitute actual adverse pos-
session depends upon the character of the land and the
circumstances in each individual case. The general rule is
well stated in the case of Burns v. Curran," which defines
actual adverse possession as:
".. . the doing of acts of dominion on the land, suffi-
ciently pronounced and continuous in character to
charge the owner with notice that an adverse claim
to the land is asserted. Neither actual occupancy,
cultivation, nor residence is required to constitute
actual possession. Where property is so situated as
not to admit of permanent useful improvements, a
continued claim of one, evidenced by public acts of
ownership such as he would exercise over property
which he claimed in his own right and would not ex-
ercise over property which he did not claim, may con-
stitute actual possession.' 12
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, held that
the possession asserted by the appellee by having recorded
a plat including the disputed land, subdividing and staking
Ibid., 446.
897 Md. 285, 54 A. 1006 (1903).
'Ibid., 292. The court stated:
"There would appear to be no clearer principle of reason andjustice than this: that if the rightful owner is in the actual occupancy
of a part of a tract, by himself or a tenant, he is in the constructive
and legal possession and seisin of the whole, unless he Is disseised
by actual occupation and dispossession."
10 Bishop v. Stackus, 206 Md. 493, 498, 112 A. 2d 472 (1955).
n282 Ill. 476, 118 N.E. 750 (1918).
-Ibid., 752.
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off lots within that area, advertising the property for sale
by public auction and paying taxes on the land, was di-
vested by the combination of inaction by the appellee from
1925 to 1938 and the constructive possession by the true
owner during that time, even though the appellee con-
tinued to pay taxes on the land. The Court seemed to
assume that the aforementioned acts in 1925 were sufficient
to constitute actual adverse possession, and to adopt the
rule as to similar acts in the cited case of Guaranty Title
and Trust Corp. v. United States." However, in this case,
the court did not discuss the question of what would con-
stitute abandonment of adverse possession gained by the
aforementioned acts.
The courts are in disagreement as to when an abandon-
ment of adverse possession has occurred. Some courts take
the view that abandonment is a question of intention and
that there can not be an abandonment of adverse posses-
sion without an intention to relinquish the claim of owner-
ship. 4 It has been held that fifteen years of inaction did
not constitute abandonment as a matter of law.'" Other
courts have gone to the opposite extreme and held that
the moment the land becomes vacant the law restores the
legal seisin to the holder of the legal title.'" The predomi-
nant view seems to lie between the two extremes and is
well stated in Tiffany:' 7
"Interruption of the continuity of possession may
result from the cessation by the person in possession
of his exercise of acts of possession or ownership over
the land.
But the mere fact that the acts of possession are
not continuous, or that the owner does not continue
in actual occupancy does not necessarily show an in-
terruption of the possession, this depending on the
'264 U.S. 200 (1923) which held that platting of land, advertising its
ownership, opening streets and other improvements is sufficient to acquire
title by adverse possession, even without color of title. See also: Ben
Joy Inv. Co. et al. v. Stillman, 114 Fla. 703, 154 So. 829 (1934)-platting
and laying off into town lots is an act of ownership which constitutes ad-
verse possession; Succo v. Worthington, 104 F. 2d 472 (4th Cir. 1939)-the
dividing of land into lots, the marking of the lots, the putting up of ad-
vertisements offering them for slale constituted evidence of adverse pos-
session.
'"Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P. 2d 561 (1946) ; Goodrich v.
Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576, 186 P. 844 (1919).
Patchin v. Stroud, 28 Vt. 394 (1856); Langdon v. Templeton, 66 Vt.
173, 28 A. 866 (1894).16 Philbin v. Oarr, 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N.E. 19 (1920); Wilson v.
Braden, 56 W. Va. 372, 49 S.E. 409 (1904).
174 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939).
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character of the acts necessary to constitute actual
possession, the intention of the possessor, and the cir-
cumstances in the case."' 8
Although it did not describe what constitutes abandon-
ment of adverse possession, the Maryland Court of Appeals
seems to take a strict view of the rights of the adverse pos-
sessor in this respect. Not only must there be sufficient
acts to constitute adverse possession ab initio, but there
must be ample evidence of the continuation of these acts
for the statutory period in order for the adverse claimant
to acquire good title. It appears from the holding in this
case that Maryland rejects the liberal view that in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, when adverse pos-
session is once shown it is generally presumed to continue.
HowARD S. CHASANOW
The Discovery And Production Of Grand Jury
Proceedings
United States v. The Proctor and Gamble Company et al.1
The Supreme Court heard the instant case on appeal
by the United States from a ruling of the District Court
of New Jersey, dismissing a civil suit by the government
under Section 4 of the Sherman Act. In preparing its
case, the government had used minutes of a previous grand
jury proceeding in which the government had failed in its
attempt to secure an indictment against the same defen-
dants for possible violation of anti-trust laws.
Defendants' request for discovery and production of
these minutes, on the grounds that they would be preju-
diced in the preparation of their defense without them,
was granted by the lower Court under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.2 The government had argued for the
"'Ibid., Sec. 1162.
'356 U.S. 677 (1958).
2 28 U.S.C.A. (1958). Rule 34 provides in part:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, and subject to the prvisions of Rule
30 (b), the Court in which an action is pending may (1) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photograph-
ing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
• . . not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to
any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by
Rule 26 (b) and which are In his possession, custody, or control . .. ."
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